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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
judicial in that the question whether a confession is voluntary and there-
fore admissible is customarily for the court and not the jury.19 Consequently
the Court has not been forced to penetrate the aura of sanctity which clothes
the findings of "twelve good men and true" when acting within their tradi-
tional province. W. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMINMERCE-STATE TAXATION OF-
[United States].-Pursuant to an enabling act of the state legislature, New
York City levied a tax on all sales within its territorial limits, a sale being
defined as any transfer of title or possession. Respondent, a Pennsylvania
corporation, engages in the mining and marketing of coal of a certain type,
and maintains sales offices in New York City. Its agents solicit orders which
are forwarded to respondent in Pennsylvania. If accepted, they are filled
and coal is shipped to New York City where delivery is made. Appellant,
city comptroller, ordered payment of the sales tax on such deliveries by
respondent. The appellate division granted certiorari to review the order
and, finding that it called for a direct burden on interstate commerce, held
it unconstitutional. The decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, and
certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States, which
held: since the tax was not discriminatory and since it did not subject inter-
state commerce to the possibility of cumulative burdens, being conditioned
on a local event, it did not regulate interstate commerce and was not in
conflict with the commerce clause.'
The foundation hypothesis of classic reasoning about state taxation of
interstate commerce has always been Marshall's epigram, "The power to,
tax involves the power to destroy.' 2 If taxation was charged with a poten-
tial so dynamic, then a fortiori it constituted a regulation. Thus, that all
state taxes on interstate commerce were regulatory was a foregone conclu-
sion; all that remained for decision was whether a given tax actually fell on
interstate commerce.3
Deciding that question was solely a matter of charting a boundary
between the concepts of interstate commerce and intrastate commerce. If
the subject taxed was held to lie on the interstate side of the border, the
tax was abated; 4 if on the intrastate, the tax was sustained.5 In more
complex cases, where the commerce taxed had a dual aspect, at once inter-
state and intrastate, the Court adopted the criterion of the directness or in-
directness of the burden which a tax laid on interstate commerce. If the
tax fell on an interstate phase, the burden was direct and the tax was
void;6 if on an intrastate phase, the burden was indirect and the tax was
19. 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, 216, sec. 861.
1. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. (1940) 60 S. Ct. 388.
2. McCulloch v. Maryland (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
3. Cf. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 320, 320-327.
4. Coe v. Errol (1886) 116 U. S. 517.
5. Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota (1926) 272 U. S. 469.
6. State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co. (1931) 284
U. S. 41.
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valid,7 if it was not so measured as to include interstate elements.8 Thus,
when the Court said that a tax was a regulation of, or a burden upon, inter-
state commerce, it had actually decided only that the subject taxed was in
interstate commerce, or was an interstate phase of commerce. No effort
was ordinarily made to ascertain whether the tax in its economic operation
had any actual regulatory effects upon that commerce.9 Decision turned
upon the interstate or intrastate character of the subject of the tax.1o
The opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the McGoldrick case"1 represents a
radical shift of focus. Here there is no attempt to draw a line of demarca-
tion between interstate and intrastate commerce. There is no attempt to
show that the tax does not fall on interstate commerce. The City acquires
jurisdiction to tax by virtue of the occurrence of the taxable event, as
,defined by the local law, within the territorial limits set by the enabling
act.12 That the taxable event occurs also in the course of interstate com-
merce serves to raise a question under the commerce clause. And the ques-
tion raised is not whether the tax falls on interstate commerce (or lays a
"direct burden" upon it), but whether its economic effects are of a regula-
tory nature. Since the tax in this case is not discriminatoryll and is not sus-
ceptible of cumulation by other states,14 it is held that it does not amount
to a regulation and is therefore not in conflict with the commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Stone here recognizes by implication that the federal power
over interstate commerce and the state power to tax are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.15 If a state has jurisdiction of a subject,16 it may have
power to tax that subject, though it lie in interstate commerce; but the
manner in which the power may be exercised is limited by the commerce
clause: the tax as levied must not amount to a regulation of interstate com-
7. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio (1931) 283 U. S. 465.
8. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton," Ltd. v. State Tax Commission (1924) 266
U. S. 271.
9. There have been some few exceptions. See reasoning of Mr. Justice
Pitney with regard to taxes on gross receipts from interstate commerce,
United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 329; cf. Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue (1938) 303 U. S. 250-
10. For collected citations of cases in this whole field, see Rottschaeffer,
Handbook of American Constitutional Law (1939) 333-360; and Gavit, The
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (1932) 343-383.
11. (1940) 60 S. Ct. 388.
12. Id. at 391: "All the deliveries * * * were made within New YorkCity, and all such are concededly subject to the tax except insofar as it
infringes the commerce clause."
13. Id. at 393, 397, 398.
14. Id. at 398.
15. Cf. his concurring opinion, Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky (1929)
279 U. S. 245, 252. See also Minnesota v. Blasius (1933) 290 U. S. 1; and
Note (1933) 43 Yale L. J. 337, 338, 339.
16. There may be other requirements for jurisdiction than the territorial
one which the instant case applies. Cf. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,
Inc. (1940) 60 S. Ct. 504, 506, where Mr. Justice Stone, concurring, finds
the tax void because its subject has no reasonable relation to its purpose.
Is this a jurisdictional limitation: the state has no jurisdiction of the
subject for the purpose?
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merce. Whether it is a regulation is to be determined by examination of
the economic effects of the tax.'7 This would seem to be a fair summary
of the position of Mr. Justice Stone and current majority of the Court
as inferable from the instant case. Whether this position will continue to
prevail is a question for the future.'8
A. C. G.
CORPORATIONS-INDENTURE LIMITATION ON BONDHOLDER'S RIGHT OF Ac-
TION-REFERENCE FROM BOND TO INDENTURE-[Michigan] .- Plaintiff was the
holder of past due and unpaid bonds secured by a trust indenture. The
bonds contained the following provision: "reference is hereby made [to the
indenture] for a description of the property mortgaged and the nature and
extent of the security and the rights of the holders of said bonds in regard
thereto and the terms and conditions upon which said bonds are issued
and secured." The indenture provided that proceedings in law or equity
could be instituted and maintained only in the name of the indenture trustee.'
Plaintiff sought to recover on the bonds; defendant contended that plaintiff
was not the proper party to bring suit because of the restrictive provision
contained in the indenture and reference thereto in the bonds. Held, the
plaintiff had the right to maintain the action.2
It is well settled that an individual's right to sue on corporate bonds can
be so restricted that only the trustee named in the indenture can bring
suit.3 If such restriction is found on the face of the bond itself, there is no
question as to its validity. The problem usually arises where the bond
refers the holder to a restrictive provision in the trust indenture. In these
cases the question turns on whether the reference is sufficient. 4 In the in-
stant case the members of the court agreed in result but disagreed as to the
basis of the decision. The majority of judges felt that, to be effective, the
restriction must be on the face of the bond and that therefore the adequacy
17. The evidence of regulatory effect in the instant case-non-discrimina-
tion and non-cumulability-is perhaps an unsubtle gauge for measuring
subtle relations. But there seems to be no reason why expert evidence should
not be considered. Cf. Mann, Is American "Balkanization" Unavoidable?
(Winter 1939-1940) 9 The American Scholar 52.
18. Three judges dissented strongly in the instant case. It is worthy
noting that Mr. Justice Stone led a somewhat analogous revolt in the field
of state taxation of federal instrumentalities. See Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466.
1. This provision further provided that only when the trustee refused to
institute suit on the request of the needed number of bondholders can these
bondholders institute suit in their own name and for the benefit of all the
bondholders.
2. Guardian Depositors Corp. v. David Stott Flour Mills Inc. (Mich.
1939) 289 N. W. 122.
3. For a collection of cases, see Note (1937) 108 A. L. R. 90.
4. What is a sufficient reference varies in different jurisdictions. For
a collection of cases in which the restriction was held binding, see Notp
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 96. For cases holding restriction not binding, see Note
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 100. McClelland and Fisher, Law of Corporate Mort-
gage Bond Issues (1937) 139.
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